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By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies 
Let us be clear, whoever wins this election Brexit will not be “done” any time soon. All 
claims that somehow Brexit can “get done” are fundamentally spurious. This is not a 
contentious statement to make: it follows inexorably from the structure of negotiations and 
what both sides see as their “red lines”. 
A Conservative majority is by far the most likely outcome today. That does not mean it is 
certain, but it does mean it is probable. Let us therefore consider first of all what a Tory 
majority might mean in practice. The first question relates to how large such a majority might 
be. At the moment, polls speculate that this might lie somewhere between 20 and 60. 
A majority of 20 would probably be sufficient for Johnson to enact his agenda, at least in the 
early part of the term. Anything much smaller than this could pose a challenge, although it is 
noteworthy that all Tory candidates have pledged allegiance to Johnson’s Withdrawal 
Agreement (the so-called “deal”). A majority of 60 would look very different: it would be the 
largest Conservative majority since 1987 and would allow Johnson to push through sweeping 
changes. It is not at all clear what these might look like. 
I suspect that providing Johnson wins any majority at all, the Withdrawal Agreement will be 
ratified. Beyond this, things are much less certain. Once the Withdrawal Agreement has been 
ratified, the UK will enter what is euphemistically termed a “transition” or “implementation” 
period. This is a complete misnomer: there is nothing to implement, nor do we know what 
we’re supposed to be transitioning to. 
In reality, therefore, this period will be used to begin negotiations on what happens in future. 
Johnson’s contention that an FTA (and I use the term advisedly) can be fully agreed, signed 
and ratified in 12 months does not hold up to scrutiny. 
The EU have been quite open about this: agreeing an FTA with third parties is time 
consuming (not least because of the legal processes, including ratification, which must be 
followed on the European side). In exchange for tariff-free access to the EU market, the EU 
will want to ensure that the UK does not undercut common EU standards. This almost 
guarantees that an FTA will be a so-called “mixed agreement”, requiring unanimous sign-off 
(and ratification by) all member states. Certain regional parliaments (notably in Belgium) will 
also have a veto. 
The upshot is that an FTA of the form envisaged by many in the Tory party is going to be 
virtually impossible to agree in a year. Johnson therefore has two options: firstly, he can opt 
for what will essentially be “no deal” in January 2021 (i.e. the cliff-edge will have been 
delayed but not avoided). This will pose serious questions, not least in terms of ensuring that 
all the procedures relating to East-West trade with Northern Ireland will be in place in time. 
His second option is to agree to cleave to EU rules in a number of areas very closely. It seems 
likely that hardliners within the Conservative Party will balk at such an outcome as it would 
essentially undermine much of their reason for leaving the EU – a dislike of EU regulation 
and the regulatory framework. The UK would end up with less sovereignty rather than more 
(although many of us would argue that is an unavoidable corollary of leaving the EU). 
The latter would certainly be easier in operational terms and would allow Johnson to claim 
that he had fulfilled his pledge to “get Brexit done”. Ultimately, however, it would end up 
being something of a pyrrhic victory, leaving the UK as a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker. 
Certain face-saving measures would probably be agreed with the EU negotiating team and 
there might be some restrictions on the free-movement of labour. 
A Labour majority is vanishingly unlikely, so I do not wish to dwell excessively on that 
possibility. Were such an outcome to occur, it would mean a sweeping set of changes to 
reduce inequality. Some measures appear likely to be successful in this regard, although 
others look ambitious. Some of the more far-reaching changes might prove challenging to 
successfully deliver in a 5 year term and have unintended consequences. 
The only realistic alternative to a Conservative majority is a hung parliament, which would 
have very interesting consequences depending on the exact permutations of seats, etc. I 
cannot envisage a situation where the DUP supports the current Withdrawal Agreement, 
although I suppose it might be possible under certain circumstances at a stretch. The only 
feasible coalition partners for the Conservatives are the group of former Tories currently 
standing as independents and the Liberal Democrats. 
This is a more feasible coalition than many seem to believe. Swinson’s Liberal Democrats are 
natural partners to the Conservative Party in many ways: aside from Brexit, they share a 
number of core beliefs. The Liberal Democrats tend to support a smaller state than Labour 
and were joint partners in the earlier Lib-Dem/Conservative coalition that sought substantial 
cuts to public services in the name of fiscal rectitude. 
Both agree that these went too far, and both would seek to partially reverse some of them, 
whilst maintaining a smaller state than the European norm (and that envisaged by Labour). 
The natural precondition for such a coalition would be a referendum on Johnson’s 
Withdrawal Agreement and the associated political declaration. Johnson might agree to this: I 
suspect remaining PM is vastly more important to him than whatever happens regarding 
Brexit. Whether the hardliners in the Conservative Party agree is more difficult, although 
they might gamble on the possibility of winning. 
The final, interesting, alternative is a “rainbow coalition”. It is likely that a change in Labour 
leadership would be a precondition for the Liberal Democrats to support it and a new Indyref 
would be sought by the SNP. The form this took (minority government, confidence-and-
supply or coalition) would depend on what was agreed. 
In terms of Brexit, contrary to public perceptions, Corbyn’s Labour Party actually have a 
rather clear set of policies. They would seek to renegotiate a “Brexit deal” and follow this by 
a referendum. The EU is likely to agree to this, although some member states (notably 
France) would probably prefer to see the UK outside of the “club”. 
I suspect that there would be very modest amendments to the Withdrawal Agreement 
(potentially pushing the date of transition outwards and agreeing interim payments), which 
the EU would be loath to touch. The more substantive alteration would be to any future 
partnership, where I think negotiations would begin in earnest. Ultimately, this is likely to 
involve the UK cleaving quite closely to EU standards. 
Any referendum would thus offer a choice between a “soft Brexit” and no Brexit. Current 
polling suggests that “Remain” would win such a vote. Such a vote would be hard fought and 
potentially quite dirty, given recent electoral experiences. In any case, the Brexit issue would 
thus end up being put to bed for the foreseeable future, although inevitably a substantial pool 
of voters would be deeply unhappy at the outcome. 
 
